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PAYMENTS BY CHECK AS VOIDABLE
PREFERENCES: THE IMPACT OF
BARNHILL v. JOHNSON
Paulette J. Delk*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the Code)1, the trus-
tee in bankruptcy has the duty to seek to avoid "preferential" trans-
fers of the debtor's property made ninety days or less before the
date of the filing of the bankruptcy case.2 Because of the delay that
may occur between the time a check in payment of a debt is deliv-
ered by the debtor and when it is honored by the drawee bank, de-
termining when the transfer was made to the payee-creditor has
been a difficult issue for courts to resolve.3
The Supreme Court recently addressed this problem when it
ruled, in Barnhill v. Johnson, that the date of honor of the check is
the transfer date for purposes of preference law.4 The Court's deci-
sion, however, has the potential to create significant practical
problems because it frustrates general bankruptcy policy, it creates
a conflict with existing preference exceptions law, and it is inconsis-
tent with general commercial practice."
In explaining these conclusions, this Article first considers the pol-
icies and goals of bankruptcy preference law. It then explores the
language of the preference statute and analyzes the application of
* COPYRIGHT 0 1992
Assistant Professor of Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, Memphis State
University;, B.A. Fisk University, 1967; M.S.W., Atlanta University, 1969; J.D., De
Paul University, 1980. I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Robert Banks
for his valuable comments on earlier drafts.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). For the full text of § 547(b), see infra note 13. For a
discussion of other code sections discussing the right to avoid preferential transfers,
see infra note 20. For a discussion of the goals of preference law, see infra text ac-
companying notes 9-29. For a discussion of the preferential time periods, see infra
note 15 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of circuit court cases deciding this issue see infra note 78. For
a thorough analysis of those cases see Susan E. Bindler, Comment, The Effective
Date of a Transfer by Check Under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: Trans-
fer upon Delivery or Honor?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 209 (1992); Kenneth D. Ferguson,
Does Payment by Check Constitute a Transfer upon Delivery or Payment?, 64 An.
BANK. IJ. 93 (1990); Lisa R. Reid, Note, "Transfers by Check": The 90-Day Rule of
Preference Recovery Under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 1987 Duxa LJ.
712; Azita Gorton, Note, Timing of Payments by Check Under Section 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 7 CAmDozo L REv. 887 (1986); Nan S. Ellis, Preferential Payments
by Check: At What Point Is Payment Made?, 16 UCC LJ. 46 (1983).
4. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386 (1992).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 107-29.
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the statute to transfers by check. Next, this Article examines the
recent Supreme Court opinion deciding the issue of the transfer
date for payments by check and the dissenting opinion of Justice
Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joined. This Article then dis-
cusses the potential problems that the Court's decision creates. Fi-
nally, this article recommends that Congress revise the Bankruptcy
Code to adopt the "date of delivery" rule for the effective date of
check transfers in view of the problems that the "date of honor" rule
will create.
A. Bankruptcy Preferences
A preferential transfer under the Bankruptcy Code is a transfer of
a debtor's property made by the debtor to or for the benefit of a
creditor that has the effect of favoring or preferring that creditor
over other creditors similarly situated. It is quite common for debt-
ors to make preferential transfers, and outside of bankruptcy they
are generally acceptable and not avoidable.6
Preferential transfers are not avoidable under the common law1
primarily because the debt collection process under the common law
is based on a "first in time, first in right" principle.8 This principle
is not upset by a debtor's decision to prefer certain creditors over
others. Under the common law, creditors are expected to handle
their own debt collection and are not expected to act with considera-
tion for how their actions may affect other creditors.9
The "first in time, first in right" approach to debt collection en-
courages creditors to put pressure on their debtors to pay them first.
Financially strapped debtors, who otherwise might decide to pay
6. See, e.g., Ven Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bank-
ruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985); Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in
Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 756-58 (1984). Under some state statutes, certain
transfers may be avoidable because they are preferential. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-32-
27 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-636 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-68-125 (1987);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 5925 (1974).
7. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY 417-18 (2d ed.
1990) (quoting Shelly v. Boothe, 73 Mo. 74 (1880)) (discussing the nonbankruptcy
rule of debt collection); 2 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFER-
ENcEs §§ 376-84 (rev. ed. 1940) (contrasting the roles of fraudulent conveyance law
and preference law in the debt collection process); Robert Weisberg, Commercial Mo-
rality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1986) (noting that preference law did not evolve out of preban-
kruptcy law).
8. See generally DAVID G. EPSTEIN Er AL., DEBTORs. AND CREDITORS 705 (3d ed.
1987) (discussing the differences between bankruptcy law and state debtor-creditor
laws); THoMAs H. JACKSON, THE LooIC AND Limrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 122-23 (1986)
(discussing the differences between an individual collection system and a collective
collection system); JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 5 (1985)
(discussing the Anglo-American rule of priority).
9. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 8 at 705; Countryman, supra note 6 at 715; JACK-
SON, supra note 8 at 8-9.
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each of the creditors some portion of the debt owed, may decide to
pay the creditors with the greatest leverage all of what is due and to
pay none of what is due to other creditors. This debt collection pro-
cess encourages that kind of pressure from creditors and does not
discourage preferential payments from debtors.
One result of this "first in time, first in right" system is the has-
tened demise of the financially weak debtor.10 In addition, it assures
the demise of other similarly vulnerable debtors who might other-
wise have become financially solvent after a period of time. As soon
as each creditor realizes that the debtor is having financial trouble
and may have more debts than assets, the creditor pressures the
debtor for payment of its debt. Under this system, the creditor can-
not afford to waste any time in making its demand because the
debtor's assets may be exhausted before the debt is paid. As a re-
sult, the debtor is besieged with creditor demands for payment, each
one wanting to be paid ahead of the others and before the "roof falls
in." With all of the collective demands for payment being made at
virtually the same time, it is not long before the individual debtor is
completely penniless and the business debtor's firm has totally
collapsed.
One of the fundamental purposes of the Bankruptcy Code1' is the
elimination of incentives for creditors to demand and receive prefer-
ential transfers on the eve of bankruptcy.12 Often, financially troub-
led debtors who may have had a chance at survival suffer a prema-
ture demise or dismantling of assets because their creditors put
pressure on them for immediate payment as soon as they learn of
the financial difficulty. It seems that these creditors often learn of
the debtor's financially precarious condition almost simultaneously.
When their demands for payment cannot be met, the creditors, all
at virtually the same time, stop doing business with the financially
embarrassed debtor. As a result, the debtor's business immediately
fails. If payment of antecedent debts made during the period when
the debtor is having financial trouble are made risky to receive be-
cause they are subject to subsequent avoidance, creditors will be less
likely to put pressure on the debtor during that vulnerable period
10. See generally JACKSON, supra note 8 at 11-19 (discussing various effects of the
"first in time, first in right" system on debtors' assets and on creditors).
11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code or Code]. For a
general discussion of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and its legislative history see Ken-
neth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 A&. BANK& L.J.
275 (1980).
12. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 6; Jackson, supra note 6; Theodore Eisen-
berg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A L Rv. 953 (1981); C. Robert Mor-
ris, Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens and Floating Liens, 54 MtNN
L Rsv. 737 (1970); Charles Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Three
Views on Preferences and After-Acquired Property (pt. 3), 42 N.Y.U. L Rhv. 292
(1967).
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for payment.
Another reason for the elimination of preferential transfers under
the Bankruptcy Code"3 is the basic difference between its approach
to the debt collection process and that found under state law. The
debt collection process of the Bankruptcy Code is based on a collec-
tive asset distribution system that seeks to maximize payment to
creditors as a group through their cooperative efforts rather than
through their individual efforts. 14 The Bankruptcy Code replaces the
"first in time, first in right" scheme, found under state law, with an
orderly process of gathering and liquidating all of the non-exempt
assets of the debtor for the benefit of all of the debtor's creditors.
The Bankruptcy Code's process seeks to treat the creditors in an
equitable manner consistent with their original bargain with the
debtor and without regard to any last-minute grabs on the debtor's
property made in anticipation of the bankruptcy filing.
"Last minute," for purposes of determining which transfers are
the objectionable "last minute grabs" of the debtor's property that
should be avoided, has been determined to be ninety days before the
date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition."5 Bankruptcy prefer-
ence law traditionally has chosen per se rules rather than general
standards in determining what transfers are objectionable and sub-
ject to avoidance.' 6 The ninety day period is one of those rules. It is
designed to be broad enough to capture all of the transfers held to
13. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988) provides for the avoidance of certain preferential
transfers:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before date of the filing of the
petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title.
14. See, e.g., BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 7, at 39-43; EPSTEIN T AL., supra note
8, at 705; WHITE, supra note 8, at 29-30; Note, Preferential Transfers and the Value
of the Insolvent Firm, 87 YALE L.J. 1449 (1978).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b)(4)(B) (1988), increases the time period to one year in the
case of a person determined under the Code to be an "insider," a defined term at 11
U.S.C. § 101(30) (1988).
16. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAs H. JACKSON, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY 509-10 (2d ed. 1987).
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be objectionable, i.e., those transfers made in anticipation of the
debtor's bankruptcy filing that have the effect of improving a partic-
ular creditor's status within the Bankruptcy Code's established
scheme of distribution. Transfers made prior to the ninety day pe-
riod preceding the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition are
thought to be less objectionable, and thus less apt to affect the
Bankruptcy Code's distribution scheme because they are likely to
have been made without any effort to be paid ahead of other credi-
tors.17 For although the intent of the parties regarding the transfer
is unimportant under the Bankruptcy Code, efforts by creditors to
evade its distribution scheme remain a concern.18
Congress recognized that not all transfers that meet the technical
requirements under its preference rule are subject to avoidance. To
deal with the overbroad effect of the general preference rule, provi-
sions were added to except those transfers that are not objectiona-
ble.19 The transfers found unobjectionable are those that have the
effect of providing additional goods or services to the debtor or that
have the effect of encouraging creditors to continue doing business
with an insolvent debtor.20
17. See generally Countryman, supra note 6, at 716-18.
18. See generally Jackson, supra note 8, at 122-38; Countryman, supra note 6, at
725; John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of
Doubt, 67 V& L. REv. 249, 257-59 (1981).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988). For a general discussion of the preference ex-
ceptions see also Countryman, supra note 6, at 758-816; Michael A. Bloom, Richard
D. Gorelick, Heather A. MacKenzie, Exceptions to Bankruptcy Preferences: Coun-
tryman Updated, 47 The Business Lawyer 529 (1992).
20. The following briefly describes the purpose of the seven preference exceptions
provided for under § 547(c):
(c)(1) is referred to as the contemporaneous exchange rule because it excepts trans-
fers that were not intended as credit transactions but which became such because of a
delay between the time the payment was made and the goods or services were deliv-
ered. This provision is often applied to except payments by check which were given
as the goods or services were delivered but because of the delay between the delivery
of the check and the honoring of the check created a preferential transfer which was
subject to avoidance;
(c)(2) is referred to as the ordinary course of business exception because it provides
a safe harbor for transfers made in accordance with usual business terms such as the
payment of utility service bills which are technically preferential because the services
were rendered and became due and owing prior to the payment;
(c)(3) is referred to as the purchase money exception because it excepts transfers
that enable debtors to acquire additional assets;
(c)(4) is referred to as the new value exception because it provides a safe harbor for
creditors who after receiving a preferential transfer gave new value on an unsecured
basis to the debtor but only to the extent of the new value given;
(c)(5) provides an exception for preferential transfers of inventory or accounts ex-
cept to the extent that they cause an improvement of the creditor's position as mea-
sured on the date of the filing of the petition and the ninetieth day pre-petition;
(c)(6) provides an exception for statutory liens that are unavoidable under other
conditions and which therefore are considered unobjectionable;
1993]
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When creditors receive preferential transfers, the equitable distri-
bution process is disturbed and the preferential payments must be
recovered to ensure the fulfillment of the Bankruptcy Code's goal of
equal sharing of the debtor's non-exempt assets among the classes of
creditors.2 The trustee's power to avoid preferential transfers22 is
designed to deny particular creditors any incentive to take action on
their own to the detriment of creditors as a whole. 23 Thus, bank-
ruptcy preference law seeks to eliminate any incentive for creditors
to seek an advantage over othdr creditors or for debtors to give an
advantage to some creditors over others on the eve of bankruptcy.
Preference law is designed to promote the equal distribution of as-
sets among creditors with similar status and to decrease, in general,
the frantic activity among the debtor's creditors on the eve of
bankruptcy.24
Under the Bankruptcy Code, for persons who are not insiders,25 a
transfer will be a voidable preference if certain statutory conditions
are met. There must be a transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property that was made to or for the benefit of a creditor during the
ninety day period before the date of the filing of bankruptcy on ac-
count of an antecedent debt at a time when the debtor was insol-
vent. In addition, the transfer must have enabled the creditor to re-
ceive more than it would have received without the transfer had the
debtor filed a Chapter 7 case.2"
(c)(7) provides an exception for transfers of less than $600 in value where the
debtor is an individual with primarily consumer debts.
21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988) provides the trustee with the power to avoid prefer-
ential transfers. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988) provides that a debtor in possession in a
reorganization case, Chapter 11, under the Bankruptcy Code shall have all of the
rights and powers of a trustee, thus enabling a debtor in possession to avoid preferen-
tial transfers in a reorganization case. A debtor in possession is simply the debtor in a
reorganization case in which no trustee has been appointed. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(i)
(1988). A debtor who is not a debtor in possession does not have the power to avoid
preferential transfers except when the property may be exempt. See 11 U.S.C. §
522(h) (1988); 4 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 547.2113], at 547-91
(Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1992).
The creditors' committee in a reorganization case may have the power to pursue
the avoidance of preferential transfers in cases in which the trustee or debtor in pos-
session wrongfully refuses to do so. See 4 COLLIER, 1 547.21[4] (collecting cases).
23. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
24. Id.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) provides an extended reach-back period of one year
for transfers to insiders. Insiders may have access to information about the debtor's
financial condition at an earlier time than non-insiders and are likely to receive pref-
erential transfers earlier. See, e.g., Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186
(7th Cir. 1989); John Tuskey, Note, The Term Insider Within Section 547(b)(4)(B)
of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 NOTRz DAME L. REv. 726 (1982). 11 U.S.C. § 101(30)
defines insiders to include relatives and partners of individual debtors and directors,
officers, partners and relatives of those of corporate debtors.
26. For full text of the preference provision, see supra note 13.
[Vol. 45:53
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The preference provision of the Bankruptcy Code seeks to iden-
tify any disposition of the debtor's property that has the effect of
allowing the preferred creditor to place itself in a different and bet-
ter position with regard to its debt and to other creditors than it
would have been in absent the transfer.2 The ninety day preference
period is an arbitrary number of days but the general time period
appears well-suited for the purpose of providing the trustee with the
power to avoid transfers made during a time when creditors are
likely to suspect that a bankruptcy filing is imminent and are thus
likely to put pressure on debtors to make preferential payments to
them. It also serves to put creditors on notice that their transactions
with debtors on the brink of the debtors filing bankruptcy may be
subsequently avoided by the trustee.
The burden is on the trustee to prove the existence of each of the
technical elements of an avoidable preference.2 8 The trustee usually
has little difficulty meeting the insolvency element because insol-
vency is presumed under the statute during the ninety day period.2 0
Generally it is not difficult for the trustee to show that immediately
preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition a creditor received a
transfer or benefitted from it. In cases in which the preferred credi-
tor is not fully secured and the debtor cannot pay 100 percent of its
debts, the trustee will ordinarily be able to prove that the creditor
received more than it would have received without the transfer if
there were liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.30
It is not always easy, however, for the trustee to identify exactly
what property was transferred and when the transfer occurred for
purposes of the preference provision. Determining the effective date
of the transfer is crucial for the purpose of meeting the ninety day
period requirement as well as for purposes of meeting the antece-
dent debt requirement. It is essential to the trustee's proof that the
trustee, inter alia, establish that the debtor has transferred some
property interest.31 However, determining whether what was trans-
ferred was actually an "interest of the debtor in property" and when
27. See Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
HR Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18-19 (1973) [hereinafter Commis-
sion Report].
28. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (g) (1988). This section provides in pertinent part: "(g) the
trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of a transfer under subsection (b)
of this section." See, e.g., Moran Bros., Inc. v. Yinger, 323 F.2d 699, 701 (10th Cir.
1963); Brown v. Callaway Bank (In re Meritt), 7 B.R. 876, 879 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1980).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1988) provides in pertinent part: "the debtor is presumed
to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of
the filing of the petition."
30. See Countryman, supra note 6, at 736.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988) ("the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest
of the debtor in property").
19931
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it was transferred can be difficult.
B. Transfer of an Interest of the Debtor in Property
To avoid a preference, the trustee must prove that a transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property occurred.32 The preference provi-
sion, however, does not define the term "transfer." Either Congress
assumed the meaning of the term to be self-evident or intended that
the definition provided elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code should
prevail.
The courts have accepted as the proper definition of "transfer"
within the preference provision the very broad definition contained
in the general provisions section of the Bankruptcy CodeAs "Trans-
fer" includes "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with
property or with an interest in property. . . . "1 That broad defini-
tion provides that every possible means of disposing of property will
be considered a transfer. The definition seeks to make it clear that
the disposition does not have to be of tangible property-it includes
an interest in intangible property as well. That definition, with its
use of the all-encompassing term "every" and other terms that evi-
dence a desire to include the greatest range of possibilities, such as
"direct or indirect," "absolute or conditional," "voluntary or invol-
untary," is a very broad definition.
3 5
This broad definition of "transfer" existed under the Code's pred-
ecessor, the Bankruptcy Act. 6 In preference cases under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, courts applied this very broad definition of "transfer. 3 7
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1389-91 (1992); Global Distrib.
Network, Inc. v. Star Expansion Co., 949 F.2d 910, 912-13 (7th Cir. 1991); Newton
Exploration Co., Inc. v. Fredman, 92 B.R. 416, 418-19 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988); In re
Duffy, 3 B.R. 263, 265 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
34. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(54) (West Supp. 1992). This definition of "transfer" is used
to define that term as used in § 547, the preference provision; § 522(f), the lien avoid-
ance provision; § 544, the trustee's avoidance powers through its hypothetical lien
creditor and unsecured creditor status; § 548, the fraudulent transfer provision; and §
549, post-petition transactions.
35. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1977) (Congress intended
this term to be "as broad as possible").
36. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 1(25), 30 Stat. 545 (1898) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(54) (West Supp. 1992)) [hereinafter the Act] provided:
shall include the sale and every other and different mode of disposing of or
parting with property,or the possession of property, absolutely or condition-
ally, as a payment, pledge, mortgage, gift or security; ...
See 3 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, part 2, 1 60.0711] at 786 (14th
ed. 1988) (discussing the comprehensive nature of the definition of the term "trans-
fer" under the Act.).
37. See, e.g., National Bank of Newport v. National Herkimer County Bank, 225
U.S. 178, 184 (1912); Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 443-44 (1901);
New Jersey Nat'l Bank v. Gutterman (In re Applied Logic), 576 F.2d 952, 962 (2d
[Vol. 45:53
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After appointing a Commission 8 to study, analyze, evaluate, and
recommend changes in the Act, Congress adopted the revised Bank-
ruptcy Code.39 The Bankruptcy Code as finally drafted by Congress
contained no separate definition of "transfer" in the preference pro-
vision nor was one recommended by the Commission. The definition
of transfer in the general provision of the Bankruptcy Code re-
mained a very broad one just as it existed in the Act.40 Apparently,
neither the Commission nor Congress saw a need to change the
broad definition of "transfer" for preference purposes. Congress ac-
cepted this broad definition of "transfer," effectively deciding to be
over-inclusive thereby discouraging creditors from taking preferen-
tial transfers.
Congress did add a provision to the Bankruptcy Code under the
preference law, now codified as section 547(e)(2) of title eleven of
the United States Code, describing when a transfer is made.4 ' This
provision allows creditors a ten day grace period within which they
may take any steps needed to protect their interests in property
transferred from the debtor.4 2 If all necessary steps "to perfect" the
transfer are taken within the ten day period, the transfer is deemed
to have occurred on the date the transaction or conveyance became
effective between the debtor and the creditor.'3 If the steps are
taken more than ten days after the effective date, the transfer is
deemed to have occurred on the date the steps to perfect the trans-
action were finally taken.4
In section 547(c)(2), the Bankruptcy Code uses the term "per-
fected" to describe how to determine the time at which the transfer
is made. There is, however, no definition of the term "perfection" in
the Bankruptcy Code. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, this
Cir. 1978); Katz v. First Nat'l Bank of Glen Head, 568 F.2d 964, 969 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
38. Bankruptcy Study Commission, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
39. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1978). After the Commission completed its study of the
Act, it filed a two-part report with its findings, recommendations and a proposed bill
which Congress adopted, with major change. Commission Report, supra note 27, pts.
1,2 (1973).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (1978).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) provides, in relevant part:
(2) For the purposes of this section, .. . a transfer is made-
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the
transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such
time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected
after such 10 days;. ...
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. See also, Brown v. Callaway Bank (In re Meritt), 7 B.R. at 878 (applying §
547(e) to a security interest to determine when the transfer was "made").
1993]
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term refers to security interests; 5 however, section 547(e) is neither
expressly nor implicitly limited to the determination of the transfer
date for security interests. Section 547(e) expressly states that it ap-
plies to all of section 547, not only those parts applicable to security
interests.4 6 A cursory review of section 547 reveals that it involves a
broader range of transfers than security interests, although many
courts have interpreted the section to apply only to security
interests.47
A reasonable interpretation of the term "perfected" as used in
subsection 547(e) is that it refers to the condition that exists when
one has an interest in property that cannot be defeated by after-
acquired rights of third parties. In subsections 547(e)(1)(A) and (B),
the Bankruptcy Code uses just that kind of analysis to identify
when a transfer of real property, fixtures, and property other than
real property is perfected.4 8  In each instance, subsections
547(e)(1)(A) and (B) establish that transfers of those interests are
made only when no third party can acquire a superior interest.
Under this analysis, "perfection," as used in this provision, may re-
fer to the honoring of a check-the step necessary for a payee on a
check to acquire an interest in the debtor's bank account that can-
not be defeated by third parties.' 9
Since this broad definition of transfer includes conditional as well
as absolute dispositions of property, a transfer may occur while the
disposition of the interest in property is still contingent upon the
occurrence of some other event. Assuming that the later event oc-
curs, the date of transfer, pursuant to section 547(e), for purposes of
the preference avoidance provision, might be deemed to relate back
to the date when the disposition was still conditional.
45. U.C.C. §§ 9-301 to 9-306 (1972).
46. Both §§ 547(e)(1) and (2) begin "For the purposes of this section ... " (em-
phasis added, referring to all of § 547 rather than § 547(c)(3), the only portion of the
preference provision that applies exclusively to security interests).
47. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Nestle Libbys P.R., Inc., 729 F.2d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 1984);
Chaitman v. Chicago Boiler Co. (In re Almarc Mfg., Inc.), 52 B.R. 582, 584 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1985); Franzwa v. Pro Sales, Inc. (In re Walker Indus. Auctioneers, Inc.), 45
B.R. 452, 454 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984).
48. §§ 547(e)(1)(A) and (B) provide, in pertinent part:
(e)(1) For the purposes of this section-
(A) a transfer of real property other than fixtures, . is perfected when
a bona fide purchaser of such property from the debtor against whom appli-
cable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest
that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is per-
fected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien
that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
49. See Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S.Ct. 1386, 1393 (1992) (Justice Stevens, in a
dissenting opinion, argued that under § 547(e)(1)(8), a check is perfected when it is
honored).
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Checks
A satisfactory resolution of the problem of determining when a
transfer by check is made, when it is delivered or when it is honored
should take into account the legal significance of the use of checks in
commercial transactions. This, in turn, requires a careful considera-
tion of the statutory law governing the use of checks and the eco-
nomic implications of check transactions.
Checks are a form of negotiable instruments and are governed
under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code.50 Under Article 3,
checks are drafts-orders directing payment drawn on banks and
are payable on demand." A debtor who gives a creditor a check in
payment of a debt is using the check as a "mode of... disposing of
property" 5 -the funds in the debtor's account. The debtor is giving
the creditor the means to receive the debtor's funds in the account.
After the creditor has accepted the check in payment of the debt,
under Article 3, the debtor's liability on the debt is suspended until
the check is dishonored or paid.53 Thus, receipt of the check may be
viewed as payment of the debt subject only to the bank's dishonor
of the check. A creditor who accepts a check in payment of a debt
50. UNIFOPRM COf.RCIAL CODE, 2 U.L.A. 5 (1991) (hereinafter U.C.C.J.
51. U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(b) (1896); U.C.C. § 3-104(f) (1991) (same principle stated in
slightly different language).
52. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(54) (West Supp. 1992).
53. See U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b) (1896) and Official Comment 3 which provide, in rel-
evant part-
(1) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an underly-
ing obligation
(b) ... the obligation is suspended pro tanto... until its presentment.
If the instrument is dishonored action may be maintained on either the
instrument or the obligation ....
Comment 3.
It is commonly said that a check or other negotiable instrument is "condi-
tional payment." By this it is normally meant that taking the instrument is
a surrender of the right to sue on the obligation .... On dishonor of the
instrument the holder is given his option to sue either on the instrument or
on the underlying obligation.
U.C.C. § 3-310(b)(1) (1990) states the same principle, but in more detail:
(b) ...if a note or an uncertified check is taken for an obligation, the
obligation is suspended to the same extent the obligation would be dis-
charged if an amount of money equal to the amount of the instrument were
taken, and the following rules apply.
(1) In the case of an uncertified check, suspension of the obligation con-
tinues until dishonor of the check or until it is paid or certified. Payment
or certification of the check results in discharge of the obligation to the
extent of the amount of the check. (emphasis added)
The underlying obligation is discharged, not suspended, when the check that is
delivered is certified, i.e., accepted by the drawee. See U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(a) (1896) and
U.C.C. § 3-310(a) and (c) (1990). All references to checks in this article are to checks
that have not been certified.
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must make a demand for payment on the bank and the check must
be honored by the bank if the creditor is. to actually receive the
funds or have its account credited."
Should the bank dishonor the check, the creditor acquires a cause
of action against the debtor on the check.55 The creditor, therefore,
acquires a conditional cause of action on the check when it accepts
the check for payment with dishonor as the condition.6
From a practical perspective, a creditor receives more than a mere
conditional cause of action upon delivery of the check. A debtor
with severe financial problems may seek temporary relief from the
pressure for repayment from a creditor by, for example, delivering a
check to the creditor with every intention of making a stop payment
order 57 to the bank before the creditor presents the check for pay-
ment. If the creditor presents the check and the bank honors it
before the stop payment order is made or becomes effective, the
creditor will receive the debtor's funds. When the debtor delivers
the check to the creditor, the creditor does receive something of
value from the debtor: the right to present the check and to make
demand for payment from the bank-a mode of obtaining the
debtor's property. The debtor gives up something when it delivers
the check: plenary control of the funds in the account.
The real question then is whether what the creditor receives and
what the debtor gives up is an "interest of the debtor in property"
within the meaning of the preference provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. 8 Does the creditor receive something and does the debtor
give up something upon delivery of the check that diminishes what
is available in the estate for distribution to creditors as a group? 9
54. See U.C.C. §§ 3-409(1) and 3-501(l)(a) (1896); §§ 3-408 and 3-501(a) (1990)
(same principles stated in slightly different terms). A check may serve as an assign-
ment of the debtor's funds where the debtor and its bank expressly agree that the
check should serve as an assignment of funds. See, e.g., In re Schenck's Estate, 313
N.Y.S.2d 277, 280 (Sur. Ct. 1970) (when bank was both drawee and payee of the
check, the giving of the check to the bank was an assignment of funds when the bank
and the drawer so intended).
55. See U.C.C. § 3-122(3) (1896). Revised Article 3 states the same principle.
However, the Revised Article provides the cause of action against the drawer in the
section dealing with the obligations of the drawer. U.C.C. § 3-414 (1990).
56. Upon dishonor, the creditor reacquires a cause of action against the debtor on
the underlying debt-the cause of action that was suspended when the check was
accepted by the creditor in payment of the debt. See U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b) (1896);
U.C.C. § 3-310(b)(3) (1990) (there are only minor differences between the two
sections).
57. U.C.C. § 4-403 (1990).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34. See also infra note 59.
59. Although the term "interest of the debtor in property," as used in § 547(b), is
not defined in the Code, courts have held that for purposes of the preference provi-
sion a debtor does not have an interest in property if the transfer of that property
does not diminish the bankruptcy estate so that fewer assets are available for distri-
bution to general creditors. See, e.g., Danning v. Bozek (In re Bullion Reserve of N.
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When the broad definition of transfer in section 101(58), and when
section 547(e), the provision which defines when a transfer is made,
are applied to transactions made by check, the answer to that ques-
tion is yes.
Section 547(e) provides that a transfer is made at the time it takes
effect between the parties if perfected within ten days of that date.
In commercial transactions, payments by check become effective be-
tween the parties at the time the check is delivered to the creditor
because in those transactions a debt paid by check is treated as paid
on the date of delivery of the check provided the check is subse-
quently honored in due course.60 Certainly upon delivery of the
check the debtor gives up some of its control over the funds to the
creditor. Similarly, the creditor receives the means by which it may
obtain the debtor's funds in the account. This renders the delivery
of the check effective as a transfer between the parties.
In section 547(e), the term "perfection" may be used to refer to
the condition that exists when one has an interest in property that
cannot be defeated by third parties.61 With checks, that condition
exists when the check is honored; accordingly, a check should be
treated as perfected when it is honored.
Since a check becomes effective between the parties upon the de-
livery of the check, the application of section 547(e) should dictate
that the transfer is made on the delivery date if the check is
honored within ten days of that date. Section 547(e), with its ten
day grace period, has the effect of causing the estate to be dimin-
ished as of the date of delivery of the check inasmuch as the transfer
is deemed made on that date. 2
Am.), 836 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988); Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-
London, 797 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1986); Nicholson v. First Inv. Co., 705 F.2d 410 (lth
Cir. 1983); O'Connor v. Tappan (In re Souder), 449 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971). See also
JACKSON, supra note 8, at 133 ("[A] transfer of property that is indisputably the
debtor's (in the sense that title is located in the debtor) should not presumptively be
preferential, where the transfer of that property does not diminish the property that
the remaining creditors have to enjoy.").
60. See, e.g., Regents of the University of New Mexico v. Lacey, 764 P.2d 873, 875
(N.M. 1988) (quoting Franciscan Hotel Co. v. Albuquerque Hotel Co., 24 P.2d 718,
726 (N.M. 1933)); Lakeway Co. v. Bravo, 576 S.W.2d 926, 928-29 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979); Ogier v. Pacific Oil & Gas Dev. Corp., 288 P.2d 101, 103-104 (Cal. Dist. CL
App. 1955); 6 RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
3-802:19 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter ANDERSON].
61. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
62. Several courts have addressed the issue of the applicability of § 547(e) to
checks. See, e.g., Global Distrib. Network, Inc. v. Star Expansion Co., 949 F.2d 910
(7th Cir. 1991) (applying § 547(e) to checks); O'Neill v. Nestle Libbys P.R., Inc., 729
F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984) (refusing to apply § 547(e) to checks); McClendon v. Cal-Wood
Door (In re Wadsworth Bldg. Components, Inc.), 711 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1983) (apply-
ing § 547(e) to checks); Remes v. Acme Carton Corp. (In re Fasano/Harriss Pie Co.),
43 B.R. 871 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 71 B.R. 287 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (refusing
to apply § 547(e) to checks); Eisenberg v. J L Int'l, Ltd. (In re Sider Ventures &
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The Seventh Circuit in Global Distribution Network v. Star Ex-
pansion Co.6 3 applied section 547(e) to a transfer by check and held
that the creditor's receipt of the check was the date of transfer for
bankruptcy preference purposes if the check was honored within ten
days.6 The court reasoned that the broad definition of "transfer" in
section 101(58) included conditional transfers and that checks are
conditional transfers of funds at the time of the delivery of the
check.65
Because conditional as well as absolute transfers are included in
the Bankruptcy Code's broad definition of transfer, the Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that a date by which the conditional transfer must
become absolute should be established " and applied the ten day pe-
riod of section 547(e). It held that section 547(e) governs all of the
preference provisions and that "perfection" as used in section 547(e)
refers to the honoring of a check. The court reasoned that
"[h]onoring a check 'perfects' the transfer because thereafter 'a
creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is
superior to the interest of the transferee.' "67 Applying section 547(e)
in this manner the Seventh Circuit suggested, eliminates any incen-
tive for the advance delivery of checks as well as any incentive to
defer the presentment of the check.68
The practice of measuring the payment of a debt paid by check
from the date of delivery, when the check is subsequently honored,
is common in commercial practice 9 as well as in other areas of the
law such as securities, 70 real estate,7 1 insurance,7 2 elections,7 3 and
taxation.7 4 In Clark v. Commissioner,7 5 the Third Circuit, construing
Services Corp.), 33 B.R. 708, 711 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 47 B.R. 406 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (applying § 547(e) to checks).
63. 949 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1991).
64. Id. at 914.
65. Id. at 911.
66. Id. at 913.
67. Id. at 914.
68. Id. at 913.
69. See 6 ANDERSON, supra note 61.
70. See, e.g., Ogier v. Pacific Oil & Gas Dev. Corp., 288 P.2d 101, 103-104 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (when a check is honored in due course, the payment date relates
back to the date of delivery of the check).
71. See, e.g., Wayzata Enterprises, Inc. v. Herman, 128 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Minn.
1964) (real estate contract is deemed paid from delivery of check when check is
honored in due course).
72. See, e.g., Texas Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n v. Tolbert, 136 S.W.2d 584, 590 (Tex.
1940) (payment of insurance assessment relates back to date of delivery of check
when it is honored).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Hankin, 607 F.2d 611, 614 (3d Cir. 1979) (contribu-
tion to candidate for federal office is made for purpose of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act prior to the time a check is deposited).
74. See, e.g., Clark v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1958); Flint v.
United States, 237 F. Supp. 551, 553-54 (D. Idaho) (taxes paid upon delivery of check
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the Internal Revenue Code, held that expenses paid by check by a
taxpayer on a cash basis are deductible for the year in which the
checks are delivered, despite the fact that the checks are still out-
standing at the end of that year. 6 In explaining its holding, the
court noted the conditional, contingent nature of the transaction. It
reasoned that:
[D]elivery of a check will establish the same right to a deduction as
would delivery of cash. It does not matter that the check was not
cashed or deposited or the drawer's account charged until the fol-
lowing year. The check is regarded as payment on a condition sub-
sequent, and if the condition of honor on presentment is met the
payment is regarded as absolute from the time the check was
delivered.7 7
Applying section 547(e) to payments by check has the effect of
regarding payments by check as transfers subject to a condition sub-
sequent just as the Third Circuit did in Clark. When the check is
delivered, the debt is deemed paid as of the delivery date subject to
a condition subsequent, the bank's dishonor of the check. The ten
day grace period of section 547(e) provides the time period for the
occurrence of the condition subsequent. The transfer becomes abso-
lute as of the delivery date, if the condition subsequent does not
occur.
IL BARNHILL V. JOHNSON
In Barnhill v. Johnson,7 8 the United States Supreme Court con-
and not deposit); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(b) (as amended in 1990) (a charitable contri-
bution is deemed made on delivery of a check subsequently honored in due course).
75. 253 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1958).
76. Id. at 748.
77. Id.
78. 112 S. Ct. 1386 (1992). This case affirmed the Tenth Circuit, Johnson v. Barn-
bill (In re Antweil), 931 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1991), which had held that the date of
honor was the transfer date of checks for preference purposes. The Tenth Circuit
gave three reasons for holding the date of honor as the transfer date for check& con-
formity with the U.C.C., ease of proof, and fulfillment of the purposes of the prefer-
ence provision. It cited the Bankruptcy Code's desire for conformity with the U.C.C.
and the U.C.C.'s provision at § 3-409(1) that a check does not operate as an assign-
ment of funds as one reason for using the honor date rather than the delivery date. It
pointed to the fact that the delivery date rule would serve as an inducement for cred-
itors to lie about the date on which the check was received and that the honor date
was less easily altered and simpler to prove. Finally, the Tenth Circuit determined
that the purpose of § 547(b) was to facilitate equal distribution of the debtor's assets
among all of the creditors, while the purpose of § 547(c) was to encourage creditors
to continue doing business with the debtor. In the court's opinion, the purpose of §
547(c) was furthered by the date of delivery rule but the purpose of § 547(c) was not.
Therefore, no reason existed to use the date of delivery rule in making the preferen-
tial transfer determination.
In deciding the Barnhill case, the Supreme Court resolved an issue that had di-
vided many courts of appeals and many lower courts for years. The division centered
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fronted the issue of whether the date of transfer of a check is for
preference purposes, the date of honor, or the date of delivery. The
Court held that for the purpose of determining the existence of pref-
erential transfers, the date of effective transfer for a check is the
date of honor.
In Barnhill, Antweil (the debtor) delivered a check to one of the
debtor's creditors in payment of an old debt and the creditor imme-
diately presented the check, which was dated November 19,79 to the
drawee bank for payment. The bank honored the check on Novem-
ber 20, the date which became the first day of the ninety-day prefer-
ence period. The bankruptcy trustee Johnson sought thereafter the
return of the payment from the creditor, Barnhill, arguing, inter
around the date of honor rule versus the date of delivery rule; however, some courts
adopted variations of those basic rules. For listings of the cases and commentary,
particularly the lower courts that have followed the date of honor rule or the date of
delivery rule or some variation thereof, see Susan E. Bindler, Comment, The Effec-
tive Date of a Transfer by Check Under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code:
Transfer upon Delivery or Honor?, 70 WASH. U.L.Q. 209, 213 (1992); Kenneth D. Fer-
guson, Does Payment by Check Constitute a Transfer upon Delivery or Payment?,
64 AM. BANK&. L.J. 93, 94 (1990).
Among the courts of appeal, only the Tenth Circuit in the Barnhill case expressly
held the date of honor as the transfer date under § 547(b). Although the Eleventh
Circuit in Nicholson v. First Inv. Co., 705 F.2d 410 (11th Cir. 1983), held the date of
honor as the transfer date, it did so under the former Bankruptcy Act and not the
Code. In New York City Shoes, Inc. v. Bentley Int'l, Inc. (In re New York City Shoes,
Inc.), 880 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1989), the Third Circuit expressed the view that the date
of honor should be the transfer date, although that was not the holding of the case.
The Seventh, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits all held the date of delivery as the
transfer date for preference purposes under the Code. E.g., Global Distrib. Network,
Inc. v. Star Expansion Co., 949 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1991) (the transfer date of checks,
for preference purposes, is the date the check is received, if it is honored within ten
days); Counts v. Wang Lab. Inc. (In re Virginia Info. Sys. Corp.), 932 F.2d 338 (4th
Cir. 1991) (a transfer of funds by check is effective on the date of delivery reasoning
that a stronger policy argument existed in favor of that date over the date of honor
and giving recognition to the commercial practice of dating the end of a transaction
from the date a check is given in payment of the debt); Official Unsecured Creditors'
Comm., Inc. v. Shaler Corp. (In re Belknap, Inc.), 909 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1990) (trans-
fer of check occurs on date of delivery, which is when check is received by creditor, if
the check is presented within thirty days and honored); Robert K. Morrow, Inc. v.
Agri-Beef Co. (In re Kenitra, Inc.), 797 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1986) (transfer of check is
date of delivery if check is presented to bank within a reasonable time and honored).
79. After filing an adversary proceeding to recover the alleged preferential trans-
fer, the trustee attempted to amend the complaint arguing that the debtor delivered
the check on November 18, but postdated it to November 19. Johnson v. Barnhill (In
re Antweil), 931 F.2d 689, 691 (10th Cir. 1991). The trustee argued that the date of
delivery did not apply to postdated checks. The bankruptcy court refused to allow
the trustee to amend the complaint and stated that the date of delivery controlled for
postdated checks as well as for non-postdated checks and that in this case since the
check was postdated to a date outside of the preference period, the result would be
the same. Johnson v. Barnhill (In re Antweil), 97 B.R. 69, 70 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1989),
aff'd, 111 B.R. 337 (D.N.M. 1990), rev'd, 931 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 112
S.Ct. 1386 (1992).
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alia, that the payment was an avoidable preference because it was a
"transfer" made during the preference period inasmuch as the bank
honored the check on November 20.0
The creditor argued that the payment was not preferential be-
cause, although the check was honored on the ninetieth day prior to
the petition, the date on which a check is delivered should be the
controlling date for bankruptcy preference purposes and here the
check had been delivered prior to the commencement of the prefer-
ence period.81 The creditor further argued that the delivery of the
check represented a conditional transfer of the debtor's funds and
that under the Bankruptcy Code's broad definition of transfer, the
delivery date should control.
8 2
The Supreme Court ruled that the date of honor should govern.3
The Court concluded that only when a check is honored does the
debtor dispose of property or an interest in property when the prop-
erty is funds in the debtor's bank account.u The Court reasoned
that the creditor gained only a conditional chose in action upon the
delivery of the check, not a conditional right to the funds in the
account.85 Although the Court recognized the Bankruptcy Code's
broad definition of "transfer," it was unwilling to hold that a condi-
tional transfer of property could include the delivery of a check.80
80. Barnbill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. at 1388.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1390. In support of its arguments, the creditor cited legislative history
that referred not to the general preference provision but to the preference exception
provision. Id. at 1391. The Court's opinion clearly expressed its failure to be per-
suaded by the creditor's reference to this part of the legislative history. Id.
83. Id. at 1390.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1390-91.
86. Id. The Court did not expand on its refusal to include the delivery of the
check as a conditional transfer other than to say that to include what it held was
transferred upon the delivery of a check-a conditional chose in action-in the defi-
nition of "conditional transfer" of the property "would accomplish a near-limitless
expansion of the term 'conditional' In the absence of any right against the bank or
the account, we think the fairer description is that petitioner had received no interest
in debtor's property, not that his interest was 'conditionaL"' Id. at 1391.
Although the Court did not provide any analysis of the term "interest in debtor's
property," and although the term "interest of the debtor in property" as used in §
547(b) is not defined in that section, the Court may have interpreted that term to
include only property whose transfer diminishes the bankruptcy estate. Many courts
and commentators have held that a transfer that technically meets the requirements
of § 547(b) but that does not decrease the value of assets available to other creditors
is not avoidable because it does not involve "an interest of the debtor in property."
Those courts and commentators define the term to include only transfers that cause
the diminution of the estate because only transfers that permit one creditor to opt
out of the Code's equal distribution process by taking property out of the estate for
themselves to the disadvantage of other creditors are objectionable. See supra note
59 and accompanying text
If the Court shared that view of the term and did not find that the check became
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The Court purported to apply section 547(e)(2),8 7 which describes
when a transfer is made, and held that the transfer was not made
until the date of honor under section 547(e)(2) because that subsec-
tion provides that a transfer is not made until it takes effect be-
tween the parties.8 8 Under the Court's analysis, the transfer could
not have taken effect between the parties before the date of honor
because prior to that date the debtor retained sufficient control over
the fund to render the check void.8 9
. Although the creditor argued that the legislative history provided
guidance,90 the Court determined that there was no reason to resort
to the legislative history. The Court cited the lack of "statutory am-
biguity" and the reference in the legislative history to section 547(c),
the preference exception provisions, rather than to section 547(b),
the subsection which determines whether a preferential transfer
occurred. 1
Justice Stevens, dissenting along with Justice Blackmun, argued
that the date of delivery should govern when the check is honored
within ten days of the delivery date.92 Justice Stevens looked to sec-
tion 101(58) to determine whether a transfer had occurred and de-
termined that under that subsection's broad definition of transfer,
the delivery of a check qualified as a conditional transfer of the right
to funds because the check served as a mode of parting with the
debtor's property.9 In his view, section 101(58) provided an answer
to whether a transfer occurred but not to when the transfer oc-
curred.9 4 The answer to that question, according to Justice Stevens,
should be determined by applying section 547(e)(2). On the facts of
Barnhill, that meant that the transfer was made at the time of de-
effective between the parties at the time of delivery as required under § 547(e) so that
the relation back doctrine applies (as it expressly did not find), there is little wonder
why it did not hold that an interest of the debtor in property was transferred.
87. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. at 1391.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The legislative history of § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code includes an identi-
cal statement attributed to Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini:
"[P]ayment of a debt by means of a check is equivalent to a cash payment, unless the
check is dishonored. Payment is considered to be made when the check is delivered
for purposes of sections 547(c)(1) and (2)." 124 CONG. REc. 32400, 34000 (1978). This
statement was made with express reference to the preference exception of the Code
and not the general preference provision. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the difference between the purposes of § 547(b) and (c).
92. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. at 1392 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Seventh
Circuit in Global Distribution Network, Inc. v. Star Expansion Co., 949 F.2d 910 (7th
Cir. 1991), a case decided only a few months before Barnhill, held, as the dissent in
Barnhill would have held, that the transfer date of a check is the date the check is
received if it is honored within ten days.
93. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. at 1392 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1392-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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livery of the check because the transfer had taken effect between the
parties at that time and the check had been perfected (i.e., honored)
within ten days. 5 The transfer took effect between the parties on
the date of delivery, reasoned Justice Stevens, because it was at that
point that a conditional transfer of the funds took place. Justice
Stevens further reasoned that the general definition of transfer is
broad enough to include conditional, as well as absolute transfers,
thereby rendering irrelevant any control over the account that the
debtor retained."
The Bankruptcy Code uses the term "perfected" within section
547(e) in a different and broader manner than the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, reasoned Justice Stevens" who argued that the Bank-
ruptcy Code uses "perfection" in section 547(e) to refer to the time
at which a creditor acquires an interest in the debtor's property over
which no other creditor can acquire a greater interest. Applying this
analysis to checks, that time would occur upon the honoring of the
check.98 Justice Stevens also noted that all of the courts of appeals
deciding the check transfer date issue in the context of the prefer-
ence exception provisions, have concluded that the date of delivery
is the controlling date." He argued that no reason existed to apply a
different date to the preference provision and that when no reason
exists to apply a different meaning to the same term in the Bank-
ruptcy Code, a desire for uniformity should mandate the use of the
same meaning."'
II COMMENTARY ON BARNHILL
In analyzing when a transfer of the debtor's account occurred, the
Barnhill majority focused on what the debtor does not give up when
a check is delivered to the creditor.10 1 Viewed from this perspective,
especially considering that the debtor retains control over the bank
account even after delivering the check, it is not surprising that the
Court found that the account was not affected by the delivery of the
check and, therefore, that no transfer was made. The Court found
that the only thing the debtor gave up upon delivery of the check
95. Id. at 1393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. For a discussion of the analysis used by the courts of appeal in determining
that the date of delivery is the transfer date for the purpose of the preference excep-
tion provisions, see infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
had not addressed this issue prior to Barnhill. In a note in its Barnhill opinion, the
Court stated: "We, of course, express no views on that issue, [whether the date of
delivery rule should apply to check payments for purposes of § 547(c)] which is not
properly before us." Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. at 1391, n.9.
100. Id. at 1393-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1390.
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was a conditional cause of action against the bank, which could not
qualify as an interest of the debtor in property."' 2
Viewed from the other perspective, the creditor, upon the delivery
of the check, receives the means by which it can obtain funds from
the debtor's account-the property here. The delivery of the check
is the means by which the debtor gives the creditor access to its
bank account-access that it did not have prior to the delivery. Af-
ter the check is delivered to the creditor, the creditor indeed has the
ability to obtain immediately the debtor's funds in the amount of
the check, subject only to the bank dishonoring the check. If the
check is not dishonored, the debtor's funds are transferred to the
creditor. The delivery of the check is a conditional transfer of the
debtor's funds. While the debtor retains control over the account
even after the check is delivered, it provides the creditor receiving
the check with a means of obtaining property of the debtor-it is a
"mode . . . of disposing of. . . property. 103
In addition to taking a narrow view of what the debtor gave up on
delivery of the check, the Supreme Court interpreted the term
"transfer" too narrowly. The language of section 101(58) is broad, as
the Court acknowledged,10 4 and unambiguous. Read literally, the
provision is expansive enough to include the kind of conditional
transfer that is involved in the delivery of a check by the drawer. By
refusing to give the language a literal reading, the Court discredited
its justification for refusing to examine the legislative history-that
is, when a statute is unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the
legislative history, and the statute should be applied according to its
plain meaning. 10 5 Instead of construing the statute according to its
plain meaning, the Court gave the general definition of transfer a
less expansive meaning than the words of that provision, "every
mode, . . . absolute or conditional, . . . of disposing of or parting
with property"'' 0 would ordinarily have.
A. Problems Barnhill Creates
In some respects, the Court's opinion in Barnhill is helpful. It set-
tles a longstanding issue and provides a simple and easy rule to ap-
ply. As noted above, however, the opinion is a questionable accom-
modation of legislative intent, and its construction of the legislation
and supporting reasoning are weak.107
102. Id. at 1390-91.
103. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(54) (West Supp. 1992).
104. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. at 1390.
105. Id. at 1391.
106. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(54) (West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
107. In many respects, Congress intended that preference law be overbroad so
that all objectionable transfers would be caught. It provided the preference exception
rule to cull the unobjectionable transfers that were captured. Congress did not in-
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Whether the Barnhill opinion is a correct construction of the cur-
rent legislation, it nevertheless has the potential to create problems.
Some of the undesirable practical consequences are:
1. After the Barnhill decision, the term "date of transfer" has two
different meanings within the preference provision, although the
Bankruptcy Code actually provides only one definition of that term.
This renders the determination of the precise timing of the date of
transfer of a check for preference exception purposes unnecessarily
difficult and confusing. This decision unsettles prior law, as estab-
lished by lower federal courts, which had recognized the date of de-
livery of a check as the date of transfer for purposes of determining
whether an exception to the preference provision applies.
2. The opinion frustrates the general bankruptcy policy discourag-
ing creditors from taking action that may hasten the debtor's finan-
cial demise and encouraging creditors to work cooperatively with
debtors who may still have the ability and means to avoid
bankruptcy. 108
3. Barnhill establishes a rule that is inconsistent with general
commercial practice and certain aspects of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 0 9
B. Policies
Despite the Supreme Court's refusal to apply the Bankruptcy
Code's literal definition of "transfer" literally, it nonetheless refused
to consider the policies of the Bankruptcy Code in interpreting that
term. If the Court had examined the underlying policies that the
preference provisions were designed to further, it might have held
that Congress intended a broad view of "conditional transfers."
The Bankruptcy Code seeks to distribute the assets of the debtor
to all creditors in an equitable manner. 1 0 When creditors remove
themselves from this system, that goal of the Bankruptcy Code is
frustrated. Preference law is designed to create disincentives for
creditors to take action for the purpose of removing themselves from
this collective asset distribution system as soon as they recognize
that a bankruptcy case is imminent."' The Bankruptcy Code seeks
to encourage creditors to work with debtors and to discourage them
from taking actions that hasten the debtor's financial
tend, however, to capture preferential transfers that were made outside the prefer-
ence period that it set. This is the essence of the problem created when payment of a
debt is made by check and the check is delivered outside the preference period but
honored within the preference period. See H.R REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
314 (1977).
108. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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dismemberment." 2
Congress was aware that not all efforts of creditors to "opt-out" of
this process would take the form of open and direct transfers of
property from the debtor to the creditor. As a result, Congress in-
tentionally chose language designed to frustrate, as much as possible
attempts by a creditor to get a head start on the assets of the
debtor."11 In defining transfers, Congress intended to provide lan-
guage that could be interpreted broadly so that both the obvious
and the subtle attempts to capture the debtor's assets, in a manner
that would result in preferential treatment for creditors, could be
identified and avoided."24
In most circumstances, applying a broad interpretation to the
terms included within the definition of transfer, including condi-
tional transfer, enables the trustee to recapture more transfers of
the debtor's property and thereby furthers the principal goal of
bankruptcy law-equal distribution of assets. 5 The very nature of
checks-the delivery, presentment, and honor negotiation pro-
cess-however, changes the usual outcome that is the natural conse-
quence of giving "conditional transfer" its usual broad definition.
When the first part of the check negotiation process takes place on a
different date from the remaining parts, and when that first part is
considered a conditional transfer because of the broad interpreta-
tion, the likelihood is greater that the conditional transfer may be
outside the preference period. This fact should not alter the consis-
tent application of a broad interpretation of transfer or conditional
transfer.
C. Preference Exceptions
For purposes of determining whether an exception to the prefer-
ence rule applies, all of the courts of appeal that have considered
this question have held that the transfer occurs when the check is
delivered and not when the check is honored.' 6 The courts of ap-
112. Certain transactions that are preferential but that have the effect of provid-
ing services or assets to the debtor are excepted from the avoidance power of the
trustee in an effort to encourage creditors to continue this kind of relationship with
the debtor. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1977); BAIRD &
JACKSON, supra note 7, at 425.
113. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1977); Commission Report,
supra note 27, pt. 2 at 201-204 (1973).
114. See, e.g., National Bank of Newport v. National Herkimer County Bank of
Little Falls, 225 U.S. 178, 184 (1912); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, I 547.03[A] (Law-
rence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1992).
115. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
116. Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. Continental Constr. Eng'rs, Inc. (In re Kroh Bros.
Dev. Co.), 930 F.2d 648, 651 (8th Cir. 1991); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Midwest Corp.,
873 F.2d 805, 807-808 (5th Cir. 1989); Durham v. Smith Metal & Iron Co. (In re
Continental Commodities), 841 F.2d 527, 530 (4th Cir. 1988); Kupetz v. Elaine
Monroe Assocs. (In re Wolf & Vine); 825 F.2d 197, 201 (9th Cir. 1987); Bernstein v.
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peal have considered the principal policy underlying the preference
exceptions-the desire to encourage creditors to continue to do busi-
ness with financially troubled debtors-and have determined that
using the date of delivery rule better fosters that policy.11 The deci-
sions of the courts of appeal settled the preference exception law on
the proper date of transfer of a check and provided certainty to
creditors seeking to prove the nonavoidability of a transfer made by
check.
In light of the Court's decision in Barnhill, it seems that the ex-
isting law regarding the transfer date of checks for purposes of the
preference provision must operate with two different transfer dates
for a single check. The date of transfer of a check, for purposes of
determining whether a preferential transfer under section 547(b) oc-
curred, is the date of honor and the date of transfer of the same
check, for purposes of determining whether an exception to the pref-
erence rule under section 547(c) applies, is the date of delivery. The
effect of this analysis is that in one statute a single term, date of
transfer, has two different meanings within the same section of that
statute despite the fact that the statute contains only one definition
for that term. The usual goal of statutory construction is to have
each term contained in the statute bear the same meaning unless
expressly provided for otherwise.11 8 Construing the phrase "date of
transfer of a check" as having two different definitions within the
same section of the statute without expressly providing so is a con-
fusing and unnecessary inconsistency that is undesirable and, hence,
should be avoided.
The Supreme Court did not address this section 547(b)-section
547(c) dichotomy in BarnhiU except to note that the precise timing
of the transfer of a check may be less critical in section 547(c) since
Congress eliminated the forty-five day rule for the ordinary course
of business preference exception. 19 While precise timing of the
RJL Leasing (In re White River Corp.), 799 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1986); O'Neill v.
Nestle Libbys P.R., 729 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 1984).
117. See supra notes 16-18, 91 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (applying the same
meaning to identical words used in different parts of a single statute in accordance
with normal rules of statutory construction).
119. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. at 1392 n.9. As it is currently enacted, 11
U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) provides:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms....
Prior to 1984, when subsection 547(c)(2) was amended to read as above, that sub-
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transfer date of the check may be less important under sections
547(c)(1) and (2), it remains critical under section 547(c)(4), the new
value exception.
Under the "new value" preference exception, 120 a preferential
transfer will be excepted from avoidance if the creditor gives new
value to the debtor on an unsecured basis after the preferential
transfer. This new value must remain unpaid at the time of the fil-
ing of the bankruptcy case. The preferential transfer is excepted
only if it is followed by a transfer of new value, making the timing of
the transfer of a payment by check critical in this subsection. 1
The undesirable consequences of this construction are illustrated
by a very basic transaction. Assume that a creditor accepts a check
in payment of an outstanding debt on Monday, delivers new goods
to the debtor on open account on Tuesday, presents the check to the
bank on Wednesday and the bank honors the check on Thursday.
The creditor will not be able to use the new value exception based
on the delivery of the new goods if the date of honor governs be-
cause the new goods preceded rather than followed the preferential
transfer, i.e., the honoring of the check, and does not meet the sec-
tion 547(c)(4) requirement. Although this creditor is the kind of
section provided:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms....
Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2597-98. The earlier
version of § 547(c)(2) with its 45 day rule made determining the exact date of transfer
of a check critical. As it currently reads, however, the language of that subsection
does not depend upon the precise timing of the transfer date.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4), frequently referred to as the new value exception,
provides:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such trans-
fer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise
unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor.
New value is a defined term within the preference provision. It is defined at 11
U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) which provides, in part:
(a) In this section-
(2) "new value" means money or money's worth in goods, services, or new
credit ....
121. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988).
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creditor for whom this safe harbor was designed, it will find no relief
despite the added assets that it has given the debtor simply because
of the timing of the check transfer. Thus, despite suggestions from
the Supreme Court to the contrary, the language of section 547(c)(4)
continues to make the need for the precise timing of check transfers
extremely important.
D. Checks in Commercial Transactions
Among those regularly engaged in commercial transactions, checks
given in payment of goods are treated as payments made in cash. ' 2
When a person engaged in business needs goods for the business, it
is commonplace for that businessperson to give the merchant a
check in exchange for the goods and for the merchant to treat the
transaction as a cash transaction with the creation of no debt. Simi-
larly, debts on open account are regularly treated as fully paid when
the debtor delivers a check in the amount of the debt to the
creditor.
The drafters of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code recog-
nized that parties in commercial transactions give checks as immedi-
ate payment for goods, services and debts and that checks are used
as a substitute for cash.12 3 The rules of Article 3 are designed to
further this practice by making checks as negotiable as possible.
Under Article 3, every effort is made to encourage the ease of trans-
ferability and ease of negotiability of negotiable instruments such as
checks."2 4 Article 3 seeks to encourage the commercial practice of
accepting checks as cash by placing the holder of a check in the
same position as the holder of cash, as much as possible.2 1
For example, the holder in due course principle1 20 under Article 3
122. See, e.g., Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Belknap, Inc. v. Shaler
Corp. (In re Belknap), 909 F.2d 879, 883-84 (6th Cir. 1990); Quinn Wholesale, Inc. v.
Northen, 100 B.R. 271, 275 (M.D.N.C. 1988) affld, 873 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 851 (1989).
123. See, e.g., WnEuALM D. HAWKLAND & LARY LAWRENCE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SERIES § 3-104:01, at 44 (1984).
124. Id. at 44-46.
125. Id. at 46.
126. U.C.C. § 3-302 (Prior Article 3) provides:
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
U.C.C. § 3-302 (Revised 1990) provides in pertinent part:
(a) . . . "holder in due course" means the holder of an instrument if:
(1) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear
such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so ir-
regular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity and
(2) the holder took the instrument (i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii)
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provides a holder of a negotiable instrument with certain rights and
defenses regarding that instrument against third parties upon the
possession of the instrument-i.e., the check. 127 The actual date
from which the holder's rights are measured is the date on which the
holder received possession-the date of delivery of the
instrument. 128
Other areas of the law in which the date of delivery of a check is
the controlling date rather than the date of honor are securities, in-
surance, real estate, elections and taxation. 2 ' As the dissent in
Barnhill noted, under decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and under Treasury regula-
tions, the delivery date of a check controls in determining against
what year expense and charitable contribution deductions would ap-
ply when the check was delivered in one year and cleared in the next
year.1 30
Using the date of honor as the effective transfer date for checks
under the preference provision of the Bankruptcy Code effectively
treats checks as credit transactions. This treatment of checks under
the Bankruptcy Code is inconsistent with the manner in which
checks are treated in commercial practice. In order to protect them-
selves against a subsequent trustee in bankruptcy's potential prefer-
ence action, merchants accepting checks from debtors in financial
trouble, even those who accept the check in exchange for new goods,
must race to the bank to present the check for payment to beat the
start of the preference period. This result is inconsistent with one of
the goals of the preference law-stopping the creditors' race to plun-
der the debtor's assets on the eve of bankruptcy. 31 Instead of fur-
thering the goals of laws of Congress relating to bankruptcy, the
Court's holding has the practical effect of encouraging the very be-
havior that the preference provision was designed, in part, to deter.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES FOR TREATMENT OF CHECKS
In light of Barnhill, Congress should consider amending the cur-
without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored...,
(iv) without notice that the instrument contains an unauthorized signature
or has been altered ....
127. The rights and defenses of a holder in due course are provided in U.C.C. § 3-
305 (Prior Article 3) and U.C.C. §§ 3-305 and 3-306 (Revised 1990). Those provisions
allow the holder in due course to take the instrument free from all claims of owner-
ship as well as all personal defenses of all parties.
128. See, e.g., Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. 1973); Dobbs-Maynard Co. v. Jumper, 388
So. 2d 879, 880 (Miss. 1980); HAWKLAND, supra note 123, § 3-301:06.
129. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
130. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. at 1392; See supra note 75 and accompanying
text.
131. See supra note 10-14 and accompanying text.
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rent bankruptcy law in order to provide for a more realistic treat-
ment for payments by checks. Using the date of delivery as the
transfer date for preference purposes has many advantages over the
date of honor. The date of delivery rule fulfills the expectation of
the parties in a manner consistent with commercial practices,
thereby fostering, not inhibiting the growth of commercial transac-
tions. Using the date of honor rule. will likely result in creditors re-
fusing to accept checks or at a minimum rushing to the banks in a
manner at odds with normal commercial practice.
The use of the date of delivery is consistent with the broad inter-
pretation of conditional transfers intended by Congress and would
be an application of the plain meaning of the term transfer as unam-
biguously defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Although the Court
found the statutory definition of the term "transfer" unambiguous,
it did not apply that statutory definition according to its plain
meaning.
Using the date of delivery rule would avoid creating a situation in
which the same term used within the same statute is defined differ-
ently despite a single express definition. Under the current state of
the law, one must use the date of honor of a check under the techni-
cal preference analysis under section 547(b) and the date of delivery
of the check for the preference exception analysis under section
547(c), although no compelling reason exists for defining the terms
differently.
The dissent in Barnhill presents a very practical and analytically
sound approach to the matter involving checks and preferences. The
dissent of Justices Stevens and Blackmun would have held the date
of delivery as the effective transfer date for payments by check
when the check is honored within ten days of delivery. 32 Using this
rule has several advantages over the date of honor rule. The date of
delivery rule applies the plain meaning of the definition of "trans-
fer" as found in the Bankruptcy Code; it applies rather than ignores
the part of the statute that defines when the transfer is made by
using the ten day period. This limits concern over manipulation by
the creditor of the delivery date and it further fosters behavior that
is consistent with commercial practice rather than at odds with that
practice.
The Supreme Court's date of honor rule provides an answer to the
check transfer issue, but it ignores too much of the Bankruptcy
Code and commercial practice and creates the potential for several
new conflicts.
V. CONCLUSION
The preference provision of the Bankruptcy Code created consid-
132. BarnhiU v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. at 1393.
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erable disagreement over when a transfer by check occurs for pur-
poses of determining if a preferential transfer was made. In Barn-
hill, the Supreme Court decided that the transfer occurs when the
check is honored. Although the Court has now provided a bright-line
rule, its decision, unfortunately, does not put to an end the
disagreements.
The Supreme Court failed to consider the impact that the date of
honor rule would have on the preference exception provisions and
on commercial transactions. As a result, the Court's decision has the
potential to create more problems and more litigation which runs
contrary to the purpose and spirit of the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 which seeks to reduce costs and delays in civil proceedings. 13
The date of delivery rule is more consistent with the overall policies
and underlying goals of bankruptcy preference law. Using the date
of delivery rule would provide a single rule for the transfer date of
checks within the preference provision and would comport with es-
tablished commercial practice.
Accordingly, Congress should legislatively reverse Barnhill and re-
vise the Bankruptcy Code to adopt the date of delivery rule to pro-
vide a resolution of this issue that will not create additional
problems and that will be consistent and in harmony with estab-
lished preference law and commercial practice.
133. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§
471-82 (West Supp. 1992)).
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